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BODDIE AND BEYOND:
RIGHTS OF THE INDIGENT
CIVIL LITIGANT*
Introduction
shall be concerned with two cases which reflect
the growing recognition of the indigent's situation in relation to a
civil proceeding. The first of these cases is Boddie v. Connecticut.' This
Supreme Court decision was handed down on March 2, 1971. The case
involved welfare recipients and their constitutional challenge of a Connecticut law which required the payment of certain costs, about $60,
before an action for divorce could be commenced. These filing fees
were an effective bar to the petitioners' action. The Supreme Court, by
an eight to one majority, struck down this law as being violative of the
fourteenth amendment's guarantee of due process.
T

HIS CASE COMMENT

The second case, In re Kras2 was decided on September 13, 1971
by the Eastern District Court of New York. It extended the Boddie
decision into the area of bankruptcy. The petitioner therein had to
support his wife, their two children, his mother and her young child
on $366 per month. Their only assets were $50 worth of essential household goods. Kras applied for a discharge in bankruptcy of his indebtedness but was effectively barred because he could not pay the necessary
filing fee. The court, relying on Boddie, decided that the fee requirement was repugnant to the Constitution.
History
The plight of the indigent in relation to the legal system has been
recognized down through the ages. Under Roman Law, where it was
necessary to provide security before proceeding in the courts, the pauper
* This article is a student work prepared by Armand J. Prisco, a member of the
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEw and the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
1 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
2 No. 71B972 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 13, 1971).
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was protected. "The law required of him
'3
only such security as he could furnish."
There was not, however, either in Roman
or early English history, any comprehensive
statute to safeguard the poor person's
rights. In these times the indigent's "justice
appears to have been the King's prerogative .. .. 4
In England the main barrier to the courts
were the writs, which could be obtained at
varying prices. While "there were some
writs which could be had for nothing, . . .
there were others which were only to be
had at high prices." 5 Yet, during this time
period (circa 1250) "[t]hat the poor should
have their writs for nothing, was an accepted maxim." 6 Indeed, the Magna Carta
contained a provision whereby no one
would be denied justice.7 And in the midfourteenth century, statutes recognizing the
right of access to the courts were passed in
England. Their general import was that no
one could be imprisoned without process
of law,8 but the scope of protection generally was limited to criminal actions.
The cost of the writs was based on the
fee system, which was utilized in order to
pay the judges, other court officials, and
clerical help.9 The indigent could circum-

3 Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV.

L. REV. 361 (1923).
4 Id. at 366.
5 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 195 (2d ed. 1899).
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vent this system if he "would swear that
he could not pay for entering his pleadings. . . ."10 The only fees that could be
waived at common law, however, were
those to be paid to "ministers of justice"
and "public officers.""
Until the late fifteenth century there were
no statutory provisions to facilitate the
poor person's claim in the court, i.e., there
was no method for the indigent to proceed
in forma pauperis.12 However, in 1445,
"[lt]he first comprehensive in forma pauperis legislation was . . . [enacted] . . . .
providing that one who proved his poverty
to the satisfaction of the chancellor could
have an original writ and writs of subpoena
without cost.' 13 The statute also provided
"that judges should assign attorneys and
counsel to act without fee."'1 4 After the
enactment of this statute, the only further
progress made during the next four cen-

Indigents to the Courts, 57 GEo. L.J. 253, 255
(1968) [hereinafter Willging].
10 Brunt v. Wardle, 133 Eng. Rep. 1254, 1257, 3
Man. & G. 534, 542 (1841).
11 Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 1046,
296 N.Y.S.2d 74, 77-78 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1968), discussed in The Quarterly Survey of New
York Practice, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 139 (1969).
12 Note, The Integration of Equal Protection,
Due Process Standards, and the Indigent's Right
of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IOWA L. REV.
223, 226 (1970) [hereinafter The Integration of
Equal Protection]. Prior to this time some in
forma pauperis suits had developed in the ecclesiastical courts. See Note, The Right to Counsel in

6 Id. (footnote omitted).

Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322, 1326

Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden Barrier to
the Indigent, 56 GEO. L.J. 516, 519 (1968) [hereinafter Litigation Costs].
s In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 379 (1970).
9 Willging, Financial Barriers and the Access of

(1966) [hereinafter Right to Counsel].
13 Note, Proceedings In Forma Pauperis, 9 U.
FLA. L. REV. 65 (1956) [hereinafter Proceedings].
14 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

7

538 (2d ed. 1937).
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turies' 5 was expansion of the rights for
"assignment of counsel and forgiveness of
costs if the litigation proved unsuccessful."1 6
The statute of 1494 did not encompass
the criminal area; its scope was limited to
civil litigation.17 Also, subsequent to the
statute, judges and other officials began receiving a fixed salary. Yet, the fee system
18
continued.
The fee system was prevalent in the
United States throughout the colonial period. After the revolution, state constitutions granted judges and clerks a fixed
salary, but they continued to receive additional compensation through the fee system.
This condition was evident in the nineteenth century, and remnants of it still
persist. 19 However, efforts were made to
help the indigent. By 1801, Virginia, Kentucky, New Jersey and New York had some
form of in forma pauperis statute. 20 How-

Willging, supra note 9, at 256.
16 Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 1046,
296 N.Y.S. 2d 74, 78 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1968).
17 Bristol v. United States, 129 F. 87, 88 (7th
Cir. 1904); Brunt v. Wardle, 133 Eng. Rep. 1254,
1258, 3 Man. & G. 534, 544 (1841) (concurring
opinion).
18 Willging at 255.
15

19 Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Persons in Civil
Cases, 2 VALP. U. L. REV. 21, 28 (1967) [hereinafter Silverstein].
Remnants of the fee system can be seen today
in that many United States commissioners, pro-

bate judges, state sheriffs, constables, justices of the
peace, clerks and other official services still require them. Id. at 29. In fact, "[i]n Arkansas ...
some assistant prosecutors are compensated only
by fees." Id. at 28.
20 Id. at 29-30.

ever, absent a specific statute, "most courts
refused to recognize a right to sue in forma
pauperis.''2' And, even in the states which
adopted the statutes, the courts were reluc22
tant to apply them.
Throughout the years there have been
recommendations that the "administration
of justice in civil areas be without charge to
the litigants. '23 But, they have had no great
effect upon the states. While it is true that
the majority of the states do have in forma
pauperis statutes 24 in one form or another,
these are subject to a host of exceptions
25
and qualifications.
In 1892 the federal government adopted
an in forma pauperis statute. 26 This statute
is also subject to the same deficiencies
present in the state statutes, the main one
being that they do not cover the major expense of litigation. It is necessary to first

Id. at 31.
Id. at 30. This reluctance to apply the statutes
may have stemmed from the belief that "there
21
22

was no criticial need for such relief." This attitude
also was a factor in causing the American jurisdictions to be slow in enacting the statutes. Proceedings, supra note 13, at 66.
23 Silverstein, supra note 19, at 22.
24 Many of these statutes were enacted due to
the increase in litigation caused by urbanization.
Proceedings at 66. It would seem that the critical

need for such statutes, which was previously believed to be lacking, had now been realized.
25 Silverstein at 33. The indigent's net worth or
the type of action that he is attempting to bring
may have a bearing on whether or not the statute
will apply. For example, Georgia and Louisiana
do not allow in forma pauperis proceedings in
cases of divorce. Id. at 34-35.
26 Willging at 256-57. The current version is 28
U.S.C. § 1915 (1964).

18
qualify under the terms of the statute before
27
being able to reap its benefits.
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to all its citizens a meaningful opportunity
to be heard. 30 A person is entitled "upon
the most fundamental principles, to a day

Constitutional Questions
The presence of in forma pauperis statutes and the limitations imposed upon those
which have been passed, result in the denial
of access to the courts to indigents. This
gives rise to constitutional challenges under
the due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment. "[E]qual
protection and due process require the state
to provide its poor citizens the services
necessary for functioning in modern society
with an adequacy which will reasonably insure their capacity for and access to equal
opportunity. '2s There are certain basic
principles which support this statement.
One such principle is the right to be heard.
This right is "one of the most fundamental requisites of due process. '29 It is a
settled principle, that a state must afford

Willging at 256-57. One of the most universal
qualifications deals with whether the applicant is
poor enough to invoke the statute. Generally, the
modern view has been much more lenient than
the earlier view. Silverstein at 45. Today's attitude
is that a person does not have to be totally destitute in order to invoke the statute. As the Supreme
Court stated in Adkins v. Dupont Co., 335 U.S.
331, 339 (1948):
[T]o say that no persons are entitled to the statute's benefits until they have sworn to contribute to payment of costs, the last dollar they
have or can get . . . would be to construe the
statute in a way that would throw its beneficiaries into the category of public charges.
All that is necessary is a showing that because of
extreme poverty it would be impossible to pay
the necessary costs. Proceedingsat 68.
28 Integration of Equal Protection, supra note 12,
at 256.
29 Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208,
27

212 (1962). It existed in the common law also,
though mainly in the criminal law area. See In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 379 (1970). It had been
pointed out that no one was condemned without
first being given a chance to be heard by being
brought before the court. See Hovey v. Elliot,
167 U.S. 409, 415 (1896). Blackstone expressed
belief in the "rule of natural reason expressed by
Seneca,
'Qui statuitaliquid, parle inauditaaltera,"
'A equain licet statuerit, haud aequus fuit.'"
Translated, this means that if a person decides
a case without hearing both parties, though his
decision might be just, he himself is unjust.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 279-80 (1st ed. 1769); see also
Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277-80 (1876);
Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350, 368-69
(1873); Capel v. Child, 149 Eng. Rep. 235, 24248, 2 C. & J. 558, 573-89 (1832).
This does not imply that there is any such
limitation on the right to due process in the United States. The Constitution provides that no state
"shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . ." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § I. There is no mention of
any distinction between due process in criminal
cases as opposed to civil actions.
30 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377-79
(1971); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Anderson Nat'l Bank
v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944); BrinkerhoffFaris Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 678 (1930); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908);
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177
U.S. 230, 236 (1900); Dorsey v. City of New
York, 66 Misc. 2d 464, 465, 321 N.Y.S.2d 129,
130 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971), discussed in
The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 46
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. (1971); see Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970); Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965); Opp
Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 153
(1941); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 1822 (1938); United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
291 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1934).
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in court.. .. -31 This is based on the underlying theory that if a party's rights are going
to be affected, he must be granted the right
to be heard. 32 If this is not done, then due
process is denied. Therefore, by creating
financial barriers to an indigent's cause of
action, the state violates his constitutional
rights.33
The right to obtain entrance to the courts
is essential to the right to be heard. It is the
"trigger [to] the application of equal protection and due process to certain kinds of
civil litigation by indigents. ' 34 That due
process and equal protection apply to "the
right to sue or litigate" is a principle that
35
has been recognized by the Supreme Court.
This right to litigate increases in significance according to the importance of the
right sought to be exercised or protected. 36
The more fundamental the right, the more
"classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and
carefully confined. '37 Access to the court
may be a fundamental right in itself, in that,
if it is denied, such would constitute an
abridgment of the first amendment's recognition of the right to petition for redress of
grievances, which right is held applicable

to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 38
As was stated previously, the specific
right to be protected may determine whether
the indigent will be allowed or denied free
access to the court. In the criminal area,
this has never been considered a stumbling
block. The court has been inclined to allow
an indigent to proceed when his personal
liberty was at stake. 39 This always has been
regarded as a fundamental right. The question which now arises is what shall be considered fundamental rights in the civil area?
It should not be inferred that if a fundamental right is involved, an indigent will
automatically be granted access to the
courts. The presence of a fundamental
right, however, necessitates that the state
or federal government show a compelling
interest in order to abridge that right. 40 In

38 La France, Constitutional Law Reform for the
Poor: Boddie v. Connecticut, 1971 DUKE L.J.
487, 513 [hereinafter La France] (The author of

this article was the counsel for the appellants);
Integration of Equal Protectionat 253.

This whole idea of a fundamental right in relation to equal protection "had its genesis in cases
involving racial classifications." Id. at 238 n.56.
39 The following cases are indicative of how the

31

Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413,

423 (1915); see Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312,

328 (1921).
Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233
(1863).

32

33

Dorsey v. City of New York, 66 Misc. 2d 464,

indigent has been protected in the criminal area.
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v.
Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Williams v. Okla-

homa City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Hardy v. United

States, 375 U.S. 277 (1964); Gideon v. Wainright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S.

321 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
34 Integration of Equal Protection at 253.

477 (1963); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.

35 Id. at 250; Dorsey v. City of New York, 66

(1957); Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565

Misc. 2d 464, 466, 321 N.Y.S.2d 129, 131 (Sup.

(1957); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956);
Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 277 A.2d
216 (1971).
40 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 638
(1969), noted in 15 CATHOLIc LAW. 265 (1969).

Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
36

Integration of Equal Protection at 254.

37

Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.

663, 670 (1966).

438 (1962); Farley v. United States, 354 U.S. 521
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the civil area, problems as to what is to
be regarded as a fundamental right have not
arisen, to any great extent, "where personal
liberty is involved and there is an imminent
threat of confinement as a result of the particular legal proceeding. '41 An example of
such a proceeding would be a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. 42 Also, whether or
not a fundamental right is involved, the fact
that the court is the only vehicle for the
exercise of that right will cause the question
of free access to take on a "greater signifi43
cance."
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those of his counterparts involved in a
criminal action. 44 It has been recognized
that "[t]here are distinctions between the
cases involving imprisonment . . . and the
ordinary civil actions. '45 There are varying
instances in which these distinctions can be
seen.
At the outset, there is the question of
whether a civil litigant has the right to
court-appointed counsel. The answer seems
to be no. 46 However, "[p]ublicly supplied

Litigation Costs, supra note 7, at 254.
45 Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968, 973
44

Civil-Criminal Dichotomy
The rights of indigents in the civil area
have not been as liberally construed as

As was stated in this case, "any classification
which serves to penalize the exercise of . . . [a
fundamental] right, unless shown to be necessary
to promote a compelling governmental interest, is
unconstitutional." Id. at 634 (emphasis in original); see In re Kras, No. 71B972 (E.D.N.Y.,
Sept. 13, 1971).
In Integration of Equal Protection the author
recognized that
[t]he fundamental right-compelling state interest
rubric . . . is a rule of judgment in which, in
the accommodation and balancing employed
when state classifications conflict with the exercise of essential constitutional rights, the exercise of the rights is given preference to the
realization of legitimate but not absolutely
essential state interests.
41 Id. at 244-45; Willging at 270.
42 See Long v. Dist. Court of Iowa, 385 U.S.
192 (1966); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477
(1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961);
Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1026 (5th
Cir. 1969) (Rives, J.,dissenting).
43 In re Kras, No. 71B972 at 15 (E.D.N.Y., Sept.
13, 1971); In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082, 1087
(D. Colo. 1971); Dorsey v. City of New York, 66
Misc. 2d 464, 321 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1971).

(D. Conn.), rev'd, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
46 Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil
Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967) [hereinafter Indigent's Right to Counsel]; see Sandoval v. Rattikin,

395 S.W. 2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 901 (1966). But see Hotel Martha
Washington Management Co. v. Swinick, 66
Misc. 2d 833, 322 N.Y.S.2d 139 (App. T. 1st
Dep't 1971).
The attempts to aid the indigent in this area
have not been very successful. Concern has crystalized into three general forms: "1) prohibiting
the use of an attorney [this step was taken in some
small claims courts]; 2) making the attorney unnecessary [this device has been used by small
claims courts, domestic relations courts, administrative agencies, and in arbitration proceedings];
and 3) supplying an attorney or a lay advocate
[this procedure has been used in civil courts, administrative agencies, and most importantly, in
the development of legal aid and service programs]." Willging at 259.
These measures have not, however, accomplished very much. The first has had very limited
application. The second has also failed, especially
in the small claims courts. These places have become almost a collection point for creditors. The
creditor is invariably represented by counsel
while the indigent, who may be illiterate or completely unfamiliar with the workings of a court,
does not have this benefit. Id. at 259-60. The
third measure has also proved to be ineffectual
due to the tremendous increase in the number of
cases involving indigents, Right to Counsel, supra

note 12, at 1323.
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counsel may be provided as an adjunct of
the right to proceed with a civil case in
forma pauperis in the federal courts, and
in the courts of a few states," including
New York. 47 But, since this provision is
usually part of the in forma pauperis stat-

4
ute, it is subject to the same infirmities. 8

Legal aid is not as helpful as one might believe in alleviating the problem. For example,
there are restrictions concerning eligibility. One of
the most severe is that based on subject matter.
The two most commonly restricted areas are divorce and bankruptcy. Silverstein, Eligibility for
Free Legal Services in Civil Cases, 44 U. DET. J.
URBAN L. 549, 572, 581 (1967).
Although the restrictions in the divorce area are
falling by the wayside there are still some legal
aid attorneys who believe ".

.

. that a divorce is

a luxury, thereby implying that none of the poor,
or only the most 'deserving' ones, should be entitled to get a divorce through legal aid." Id. at
574. The attitude regarding bankruptcy also runs
the gamut in legal aid offices; some would exclude
it altogether and others would accept it with little
restrictions. Id. at 581-82.
Inherent in any of these restrictions is the problem of funds. There is just not enough money in
legal aid to adequately supply the indigent with
counsel. To remedy this the legislature and the
courts must begin to act.
For a development of legal aid in England see
Dworkin, The Progress and Future of Legal Aid
in Civil Litigation, 28 MOD. L. REv. 432 (1965).
47 The Indigent's Right to Counsel, supra note

46, at 546. These states include Arkansas, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, New York, North
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and West
Virginia. Id. at 546 n.12. "Even a full right of
counsel should not be prohibitively expensive.
Most of the industrial nations of the world, less
wealthy than the United States, provide free legal
services to the poor." Id. at 551.

There are states which specifically recognize the
need for counsel in certain civil areas. For example, "[in North Carolina an indigent person
is entitled to court-assigned counsel or a public defender in a civil arrest and bail proceedings .. "
CCH [1968-1971 Transfer Binder] Pov. L. RPTR.
10,093.
(New Developments)
48 Silverstein at 49.

One would be subject to all the qualifications and limitations expressed in the statute in order to be eligible. The final decision
as to eligibility would then be subject to
the court's discretion4 9 and the court's consent to proceed in forma pauperis with a
public supplied counsel is usually given
"grudgingly." 50 The consequence of this is
that "the existing in forma pauperis procedures are used very little. . . ."-1 One must
also contemplate the value of such a proceeding if court-appointed counsel is not
52
granted.
This question is not a real problem in
the criminal area, especially in the case of
a capital offense. 5 3 In a criminal proceeding
the right to counsel is deemed fundamental,
and if an indigent is tried without this aid,

49 Id. at

46-48.

50 Indigent's Right to Counsel at 546.
51 Silverstein at 43.
There are two main factors which tend to limit
the effectiveness of these statutes. They are: (1)
the limitations that are inherent within the statues, and (2) the conservative attitude of the

judges. Judges are recalcitrant "to entertain actions filed in forma pauperis." Id. at 44. There
has been, however, some reform in this area. The
most widely adopted reforms have been the provisions of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act (URESA). ld. at 32.
52 Indigent's Right to Counsel at 559.
53 In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932),
it was stated "that in a capital case, where the
defendant is unable to employ counsel . . . it is
the duty of the court, whether requested or not
"
to assign counsel for him ..
The courts have become considerably more
liberal in this view. In a recent New Jersey case,
it was held that an indigent defendant is entitled
to a court-appointed counsel in any case where imprisonment could result, including prosecutions
for petty offenses. Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58
N.J. 281, 277 A.2d 216 (1971).

18
his fourteenth amendment rights are vio54
lated.
Possibly a more serious question in the
civil area, because it actually bars access
to the courts, 55 is the question of filing fees
and transcript costs. Also, in some types of
appellate action there is an equivalent to
filing fees in the requirement of posting a
bond for security before the appeal can be
taken. 50 In other cases a bond might be re57
quired before a defense can be asserted.
In actions for replevin or where an "attachment before judgment" is sought, a bond
will usually be required. 58 Copies of briefs
and transcripts necessary to the appellate

54

Accord, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335

(1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353

(1963). See Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S.
565 (1957). This case recognized the right to
counsel on a criminal appeal. See also Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

It should be noted that the basis of the argument for right to counsel is concerned with how
to make the right to be heard more meaningful.
This is the principle that the courts should keep

in mind when deciding whether there is a right
to counsel.
Perhaps attitude toward the right to counsel in
the civil area may be justified on constitutional
grounds. It might be argued that since the
framers of the Constitution only provided for

counsel in the criminal area (sixth amendment),
they meant to deny this right in the civil area.
But, this contention seems fallacious. This was
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process may cost hundreds of dollars, and
there are counsel fees and other expenses.5 9
This system of costs is a substantial barrier
to the courts for the indigent; therefore, he
may be denied the opportunity to be heard.
The predicament that these costs create
in the civil area is more extensive than that
which is present in the criminal realm. In
a criminal case the trial is initiated by the
government, and an attorney is supplied for
the indigent's defense. There are no filing
fees to be paid or bonds to be posted before
a defense can be asserted. However, problems have arisen on the appellate level. It
was held early that the in forma pauperis
statutes were not applicable to criminal appeals. 0 Therefore, the cost of transcripts
and court records prevented indigent defendants from appealing their convictions.
This inequity was finally remedied in the
landmark case of Griffin v. Illinois.'
Therein, the defendant could not afford a
copy of the transcript and court records
which were necessary to effectuate an appeal. The United States Supreme Court held
that the rights of the indigent were in fact
being violated, for the fourteenth amendment guarantees "procedures in criminal
trials which allow no invidious discriminations between persons and different groups
of persons. 0' 2 Moreover, the Court stated
that

provided for expressly, due to the inadequate

treatment that this area had received in England.
It had already been the practice in England to

recognize counsel in the civil area; therefore,
"there was no need to reaffirm to prerogative....

to deny adequate review to the poor means
that many of them may lose their life,
liberty or property because of unjust con-

However, the effort to provide counsel for in-

digent civil litigants . . . has not been pursued in
the United States." Right to Counsel at 1327.
55 Indigent's Right to Counsel at 545.
56 Willging at 276.
57 Id. at 275-77.
58 Id. at 274, 277.

5) Id. at 279-80.

60 Bristol v. United States, 129 F. 87 (7th Cir.
1904).
61 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
62 Id. at 17.
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victions which appellate courts would set
63
aside.

Justice Frankfurter, concurring, further
noted that "[i]f [the state] has a general
policy of allowing criminal appeals, it cannot make lack of means an effective bar to
64
the exercise of this opportunity.
In interpreting this decision it must be
remembered that the Court was dealing

with a fundamental right; a man's liberty
was at stake. However, the philosophy of
the Griffin Court has been extended and
has become an important means for safeguarding the rights of indigents in the
criminal area. 65
In the civil area, the development of the
rights expressed in Griffin has proceeded
very slowly. The Supreme Court early
made it clear that "an act giving the right to
prosecute in forma pauperis cannot be extended by implication beyond its terms in
conflict with existing provisions in relation

63

Id. at 19.

Id. at 24. See Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257
(1959).
65 Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams
v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (In both of these
cases an indigent's jail sentence was increased due
to his non-payment of a fine. The Court held this
type of law to be unconstitutional.); Williams v.
Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969); Roberts v.
LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Rinaldi v. Yeager,
384 U.S. 305 (1966); Hardy v. United States,
375 U.S. 277 (1964); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963); Coppedge v. United States, 369
U.S. 438 (1962); Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S.
674 (1958); Farley v. United States, 354 U.S. 521
(1957); Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565
(1957) (These last four cases illustrate that in
order to effect a criminal appeal in forma pauperis, the defendant must exhibit good faith and
the appeal must not be frivolous. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 (1964)).
64

to writs of error and appeals." 66 Therefore,
absent any express statute to proceed in
forma pauperis on an appeal, an indigent
would have to pay for his own transcript and
court record. This would be especially relevant in a civil proceeding for a writ of
habeas corpus or a writ of error coram
nobis. This same general attitude prevailed
in the years immediately following the
Griffin case. For example, in 1958 a California court held that a clerk was not required to prepare transcripts without the
67
payment of the statutory fee.
The first breakthroughs came, predictably, in cases where a civil procedure was
necessary in order to attack a criminal conviction. In Smith v. Bennett,68 where an
indigent prisoner could not afford a transcript to file for a writ of habeas corpus, it
was remarked that "to interpose any financial consideration between an indigent prisoner of the state and his exercise of a state
right to sue for his liberty is to deny that
prisoner the equal protection of the laws." 69
However, the Court limited its decision to
this type of civil action. 70 In Lane v.
Brown,71 where an indigent could not afford
a transcript in order to file for an appeal of
a denial of a writ of error coram nobis, the
Court stated that "[s]uch a procedure, based
on indigency alone, does not meet constitutional standards. '72 Consequently, where

66 Bradford v. Southern Ry., 195 U.S. 243, 251

(1904).
67

Legg v. Superior Court, Los Angeles County,

156 Cal. App. 2d 723, 320 P.2d 227 (Dist. Ct.
App. 2d Dist. 1958).
68 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
6-9Id. at 709.
70
71
72

Id. at 713.
372 U.S. 477 (1963).
Id. at 485.
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the purpose of the civil appeal is to determine the question of liberty, the courts
73
should apply the Griffin philosophy.
Recently, the states have begun to recognize the right of an indigent to a free transcript in civil actions other than those
mentioned above. One such area has been
child custody cases. In Chambers v. District
Court of Dubuque County,74 an indigent
parent's rights in respect to her minor son
had been served. The court ordered a free
transcript to be issued due to the gravity of
the situation. In Brown v. Chastain,75 the
same facts were present as in the Chambers
case. The court dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction. There was, however, a
spirited dissent by Judge Rives, who believed that the court did have jurisdiction
and therefore considered the case on its
merits. He found the criminal-civil distinction to be particularly repugnant in this
case. Judge Rives contended that "[w]e are
dealing here with rights just as fundamental
as a man's personal liberty. . . .Indeed,
there could hardly be a better case for Fourteenth Amendment protection than this
one. '" It was his opinion that this was

72. See

Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367
(1969); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385
U.S. 192 (1966); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252
(1959); Bates v. Lutrell, 2 CCH Pov. L. RPmR.,
1 13,448 (Tenn. Crim. Ct. Shelby County 1971).

Professor McLaughlin had predicted, regarding
Griflin, that "[ilt was only a matter of time before
this development would percolate into the field of
civil litigation." N.Y. CIv. PRAc. § 1102, supp.
commentary at 110 (McKinney 1963).
74 261 Iowa 31, 152 N.W.2d 818 (1967). This
case also provided that counsel also should be provided at public expense.
75 416 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1969).
76 Id. at 1027.
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another area to which the Griffin doctrine
77
should be extended.
Judge Rives reasoned that in this particular area, the right barred from protection is so fundamental as to make the
discrimination invidious. From this he concluded that the right should be protected
according to the philosophy expressed in
Griffin. This apparently is the theory that
has been used by the courts in extending
to indigents waivers of certain fees and
costs in civil litigation. As was stated in
Lee v. Habid, "[i]t is the importance of the
right to the individual, not the technical distinction between civil and criminal, which
78
should be of importance to a court.
Prior to Boddie, the Supreme Court had
recognized certain rights to be fundamental
in the civil area, even though they did not
concern personal liberty. In Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,79 the Court held
voting to be a fundamental right, and therefore found a poll tax, which barred the
complainant from exercising this right, to
be unconstitutional. The Court stated that
the poll tax created an invidious discrimina-

77 Id. at 1026.
Statutes, of course, could solve the problems

presented in granting a free transcript in a civil
appeal. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 753(f)(19651969 Supp.), amending 28 U.S.C. § 753(f)

(1964), provides that fees for transcripts in civil
appeals in forma pauperis "shall . . . be paid by

the United States if the trial judge or a circuit
judge certifies that the appeal is not frivolous (but
presents a substantial question)."
78 CCH [1968-1971 Transfer Binder] Pov. L.
RPTR. (New Developments) 1 10,882 at 11,701
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (footnote omitted).
79 383 U.S. 663 (1966); see Reynolds v. Simms,
377 U.S. 533 (1964); Integration of Equal Protection at 237-38.
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tion on the basis of wealth and consequently must fall. It also has construed the
right to travel as being fundamental, thereby
requiring the state to illustrate a compelling
interest in order to abridge it.80
Why this civil-criminal dichotomy exists
is a question that cannot be answered by
looking to the Constitution. The fourteenth
amendment simply provides that no state
"shall... deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdic's
tion the equal protection of the laws."' It
makes no specific reference to either civil
or criminal proceedings. Indeed, Justice
Douglas has remarked that "the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to criminal prosecutions.
Its protections extend as well to civil mat82
ters."
Expenses in Civil Litigation
This section will explore those expenses
which are predominately civil in nature.
They can be as effective an obstacle to the
indigent as filing fees and transcript costs.
They may effectively infringe upon the
paupers' rights to due process and equal
protection of the laws.
The first of these expenses is bonds. A
party may have to put up a bond as a prerequisite to filing suit to appealing or even
to defending an action. In the 1921 case of

80 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
81 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
1039
82 Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037,
(1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting), denying cert. to
222 Ga. 334, 149 S.E.2d 668 (1966); see Lee v.

Habib, CCH [1968-1971 Transfer Binder] Pov. L.
10,882 (D.C. Cir.
RPTR. (New Developments)

1970).

Ownbey v. Morgan,8 3 the Supreme Court
held that a law which required an indigent
defendant to post security, in the amount
of the property attached, before contesting
the plaintiff's action, was not violative of
due process or equal protection. In Williams v. Shaffer,8 4 an indigent tenant failed
to pay his rent when due. His landlord then
sought a dispossessory warrant to evict.
The tenant desired to file a counter-affidavit
and thereby obtain a jury trial on the issues,
but, in order to accomplish this, a bond had
to be tendered as security. The Georgia
court found this to be constitutional and
the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Justice Douglas, dissenting from the denial of
certiorari, contended that this bond system
was inequitable because "the indigent
tenant is deprived of his shelter, and the life
of his family is disrupted-all without a
hearing-solely because of his poverty." 8 5
In State v. Sanks8 6 the facts were similar to
those in Williams and the Georgia court
again found the bond requirement not to
be violative of equal protection or due
process. The court commented that the
payments are reasonable and "[tlhe fact
that a tenant in a particular case is indigent
and unable to furnish a bond does not permit a different conclusion. 8 7 In most other

256 U.S. 94 (1921).
222 Ga. 334, 149 S.E.2d 668, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1037 (1967).
85 385 U.S. at 1038 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
83
84

Certiorari was denied because the question was
considered moot due to the fact that the tenant
had already been evicted. Douglas contended that
this will always be the situation in this type of
action, and that the Court should therefore hear
the case. Id. at 1039.
86 225 Ga. 88, 166 S.E.2d 19 (1969).
87 Id. at 90, 166 S.E.2d at 20. The payments were
found to be reasonable because they helped to

18
civil actions the usual rule is that there is no
88
bond requirement to defend.
Bonds may also be a prerequisite to
taking an appeal. "[A] supersedeas bond is
an almost universal prerequisite for appeals" stemming from a summary eviction.8 9 If the summary eviction does not
provide for a hearing, then the posting of
the bond will be the only manner in which
the indigent will be afforded an "opportunity for a judicial hearing. ' 9 ° The appeal
also could be contingent upon the payment
of a fee. 9 This too could be an effective
bar to the indigents' use of the appellate
system.9 2 "The legal system, therefore, is
not providing the review of lower court
proceedings which is essential for the development of justice and uniformity in the
93
law."
This bond requirement is also present in
actions for replevin. This type of bond
could actually require "the indigent to be
able to pledge property worth double the

compensate the landlord for being denied his
premises and they deterred frivolous defenses to
a rightful dispossession. Id. at 91, 166 S.E.2d at
21. See Meltzer C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 225 Ga.
91, 166 S.E.2d 88 (1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
954 (1971).
88 Willging at 274.
89 Id. at 276. See West Haven Housing Authority
v. Simmons, 5 Conn. Cir. 282, 250 A.2d 527
(1968), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 510, rehearing
denied, 400 U.S. 856 (1970).
90 Willging at 276.

91 Frederick v. Schwartz, 296 F. Supp. 1321 (D.
Conn. 1969), vacated, 402 U.S. 937 (1971).
The federal court held that the $7 filing fee
required before an appeal could be taken was
constitutional. They believed that "the state may
limit access to its civil courts" in this way. 296 F.
Supp. at 1322.
92 Silverstein at 36.
03 Integration of Equal Protectionat 233.
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amount of the goods to be replevied in addition to payment of the other fees. Thus,
in practical terms, replevin is a remedy
which is unavailable to him." 94 In this area
a Florida court held that absent a specific
provision in the statutes for waiver, a writ
of replevin, unaccompanied by a bond, was
properly dismissed. They determined that
the certificate of insolvency was immaterial. 95
For the indigent plaintiff, the cost of
filing fees may likewise act as an effective
bar to exercising his rights. Without the
payment of these fees, he could not commence his action. However, before dealing
with filing fees, which were the main issues
in Boddie and Kras, it is necessary to first
consider the question of auxiliary expenses
i.e., those payable by litigants to third persons other than public officers. There are
thirty-four jurisdicitons including the federal government, which have in forma
pauperis relief.9 6 The courts and statutes
of these jurisdictions, however, "are too
often silent about the unofficial costs of
civil litigation."9 7 These auxiliary fees consist of the costs incurred for witnesses,
expert witnesses, depositions, publication,
investigatory services and of course, coun-

94 Willging at 274.
95 Coonts v. State of Florida, CCH [1968-1971
Transfer Binder] Pov. L. RPTR. (New Developments)
9483 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist.
1969). See Tamburro v. Trama, 59 Misc. 2d 488,
299 N.Y.S.2d 528 (Westchester County Ct. 1969)
(poor person unable to post undertaking, not permitted to retain chattels during pendency of replevin action).
96 Comment, In Forma Pauperis and the Civil
Litigant, 19 CATH. U. AM. L. REV. 191, 196
(1969).
97 Id. at 191.
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sel. 98 Without some type of system for the
payment of these fees, the courts cease to
be accessible to the indigent.9 9 The need for
a provision to aid the indigent in paying
for these expenses "was recognized in the
American Bar Committee's Model Poor
Litigant's Statute of 1924-25 and the
same Committee's recommendation in
1941.... ."100

One troublesome aspect in this area is
the fact that many of these costs are not
within the control of the court. And,
"[elven those expenses which can be controlled by the court are usually surrounded
with due process problems which preclude
their being waived unless there are funds
available to the court to pay for the services
rendered the poor."' 0'
Recently, some inroads have been made,
but they have not been sufficient to allow
a pauper open access to the courts. In a
1967 case it was held that granting leave
to proceed in forma pauperis does not mean
that the court should give any affirmative
assistance to the indigent in securing a discovery deposition. 10 2 In reference to witness

fees, however, a recent New York decision
declared that "[w]hile no provision of law
exempts a poor person from paying a witness his fee . . . , failure to provide for payment of such fees by the city or county
would deny an indigent party effective and
1 03
equal access to the courts."'

In matrimonial actions the cost of publication can prevent the indigent from pursuing his action.' 04 "Since the largest percentage of litigation by indigents is in
domestic relations," application of in forma
pauperis would have an "immediate and

dramatic impact for the poor."' 1 5 Prior to
the decision in Boddie, this problem was
recognized and dealt with in a New York
case. 10 The issue was whether these publi-

cation costs could be waived and paid for
out of the public treasury. The court decided that these fees were not within the
poor persons statutes' 0 7 and "that unless

portant adverse witness." Integration of Equal
Protection at 233.
103 Hotel Martha Washington Management Co.
v. Swinick, 66 Misc. 2d 833, 834, 322 N.Y.S.2d
139, 140 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1971), discussed in

The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 46
ST. JOHN'S
104

L.

REV. -

(1971).

Integration of Equal Protection at 232. See

08 Id. at 198.

Harris v. Harris, 424 F.2d 806 (D.C. Cir. 1970),

9 Silverstein at 25.

cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1971).
105 Integration of Equal Protectionat 231.
106 Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296

A further inequity also is pointed out by this
article. It deals with the fact that courts usually
only convene during the week. If a person is
indigent, he needs all the time possible to work
in order to make money. He can not afford to
give up a full day's effort in order to go into
court. Id.
100 Id. at 36 (footnotes omitted).
101 Civil Litigant, supra note 96, at 198.
102 Beard v. Stephens, 372 F. 2d 685, 690 (5th
Cir. 1967). The fact that of an indigent's "inability to pay for a deposition may mean the loss of an
essential witness or it may make it impossible to
solidify favorable testimony or to impeach an im-

N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct., Kings County 1968),
discussed in The Quarterly Survey of New York
Practice,44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 139 (1969).

107 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. §§ 1101, 1102 (McKinney
1963) as revised (1966).

The court pointed out that because of the comprehensive poor persons statutes in New York
there was never much urgency in connection with
auxiliary fees. But, since the adoption of a more
liberalized divorce law the problem of publication
had now arisen. 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d
74 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1968).

18 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER

constitutionally mandated the courts do not
have the inherent power to direct payment
of this category of 'auxiliary expense' out
of public funds."'u 8 However, the court directed the fees to be paid out of public
funds because otherwise the plaintiff's right
to equal protection of the laws would be
violated. 09 The court also implied that the
plaintiff's right to a divorce in this case was
as fundamental as the transcript in the
Griffin case or the right to vote in the Harper case." 0 Influencing the decision was the
fact that in order to obtain relief, for the
divorce, petitioner was required to go into
the courts.'
Three years later the New
York courts were confronted with the same
problem and again decided that these publication fees denied the indigent plaintiff her
rights under the equal protection clause, as
2
well as under the due process clause."
A more comprehensive system is needed
in order to help defray these auxiliary costs
if we are to allow the pauper to proceed in
a civil action. These fees contribute toward
the pauper's present condition. He is, in

108 58 Misc. 2d at 1051, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
109 Id. at 1056, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
110 Id. at 1054, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
111 Id. at 1056, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 87.

The court stated that
[tihe loss of access to the courts in an action for
divorce is a right of substantial magnitude when
only through the courts may redress or relief be
obtained.
Id.
Dorsey v. City of New York, 66 Misc. 2d
464, 321 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
112

1971).
The court in this case remarked that if an inequality exists, even if accidental or unintentional,
and "if it affects substantial rights of the poor,
[it] violates equal protection to the same extent as
does intentional, hostile, aggressive and invidious
discrimination." Id, at 466, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 131.
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fact, being exploited because of his status.n

a

The last area of court costs to be discussed will be those of filing fees. These
fees are usually covered by in forma pauperts statutes. 114 Problems arise in states
where there is no statute and in certain
cases where there is a question as to
whether the statute covers the particular
subject matter. Whether the fees will be
waived is influenced by the presence or
absence of a fundamental right. Traditionally, divorce has not carried this weight.
As a result, the filing fee requirement in
divorce actions has not been considered an
abridgement of any constitutional right.1 5
The states also were considered to have
legitimate reasons for imposing the fees,
i.e., to financially support the courts and
to deter frivolous law suits." l For example,
in Sloatman v. Gibbons" 7 the court held
that filing fees could not be waived in a
divorce action but could be paid for in installments. Consequently, absent a statute,
it was infrequent that filing fees were
waived in a divorce action.
In bankruptcy proceedings the filing fees
are much more costly than those for di-

113 The Integration of Equal Protection, at 23435.
The indigent is being injured in landlord-tenant
relationships, in consumer frauds, in problems
with finance companies, etc. If these people be-

lieved that the indigent had an opportunity to go
to court and air his grievances, the "possibilities
of unofficial relief or negotiated settlement are
greatly enhanced." Id. at 234.
114 Civil Litigant at 191.

115 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968
(C.D. Conn. 1968), rev'd, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
116 286 F. Supp. at 973.

117 104 Ariz. 429, 454 P.2d 574 (1969).
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vorce. Yet, they may not be waived. "The
best an indigent debtor may hope for is
that the fee will be ordered paid in installments.""u 8 Prior to 1946, this was not the
case. An indigent then could have filed and
proceeded in forma pauperisif he also presented an affidavit which stated that he
could not afford the filing fee. 119
Thus, these filing fees, bond requirements, transcript costs and auxiliary expenses all face the indigent before he even
begins his legal proceeding or even before
he has a chance to defend or appeal a legal
action brought against him. His only hope
is that these fees might be waived or paid
for out of the public exchequer.
Boddie v. Connecticut

In Boddie,120 the Court was confronted
with an indigent who had been denied ac118 Shaeffer, Proceedingsin Bankruptcy In Forma
Pauperis, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1203 (1969) [hereinafter Proceedings in Bankruptcy].
51.01 (14th ed.
119 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

1971).
The law as it pertains to in forma pauperis pro-

ceedings in federal court is contained in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 (1964). We are concerned with the federal
law here because the federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over bankruptcy proceedings.
If the bankrupt is lucky enough to be able to
pay the filing fee in installments, he still must be
very careful. If he "misses a payment, his petition
will be dismissed." It "is probably res judicata as
" His only
to all provable scheduled debts ..
escape now from wage garnishment, attachment
and repossession would be to file a " 'Wage Earner
Plan' under Chapter XVIII of the Bankruptcy Act
[Bankruptcy Act §§ 601-86, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-86
(1964)]." One problem, however, still remains.
In order to obtain the "Wage Earner Plan," a per-

son must pay a $30 filing fee "and there is no
provision authorizing waiver of this fee for the
poor." Proceedings in Bankruptcy, supra note 118,

at 1204.
120 401 U.S. 371 (1971).

cess to a Connecticut court due to failure
to comply with the statutory requirement
of a filing fee. Appellant sought to have the
fee waived so that she could commence an
action for divorce. Connecticut had no in
21
forma pauperisstatute.'
Boddie was initially argued in December
of 1969 and reargued in November of
1970.122 At the initial argument, the appellant relied on the Griffin line of cases to
establish a violation of equal protection. It
was contended that Griffin was not limited
to criminal matters and that the fourteenth
amendment is equally applicable to both
23
civil and criminal cases.1
Appellants also reasoned that the state's
basis for imposing the fees did not justify
its discrimination.1 24 It was further contended that since the basis for the discrimination was poverty, a compelling state
interest was a precondition to justify the
classification. 125 The due process argument
also was based on the denial of access to
the court. This claim of right was linked to
the first amendment's protection, applied
to the states through the fourteenth amendment, "of the right to petition for redress
of grievances ....

",126

These two arguments were distinguished
in that due process was much narrower,
dealing only with "the right to seek a hearing in court," and that, "[w]hile the equal
Civil Litigant at 206.
La France, supra note 38, at 511.
123 Id. at 511-12.
124 Id. at 512. "Appellants argued that the need to
conserve funds, to raise additional funds, or to
discourage frivolous litigation did not justify the
State's discrimination." Id.
125 Id.
121
122

126

Id. at 513.
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protection argument might fail if the interest involved was not significant or serious
enough to be constitutionally cognizable,
.. . any denial of the right to petition for
redress was constitutionally cognizable.
"127

On reargument the appellants placed the
main thrust of their argument on the due
process clause.' 28 They contended that
since the right to marriage had been recognized as constitutionally fundamental by
the Supreme Court, the state could not discriminate on the basis of wealth in a di129
vorce proceeding.
The Supreme Court finally handed down
the Boddie decision on March 2, 1971. By
an eight to one majority, they reversed the
district court's decision and found that "due
process does prohibit a State from denying,
solely because of inability to pay, access to
its courts to individuals who seek judicial
0
dissolution of their marriages.""13
Justice Harlan wrote the majority opinion for the Court. He stated that due process typically has been concerned with the
rights of defendants and not those "seeking
access to the judicial process in the first
instance."' 131 He believed, however, that
"marriage involve[d] interests of basic im-

portance

...

132

and noted that the courts

were the only legal means if one wished to
dissolve a marriage. Therefore, these plain-

127
128

Id. at 516. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
130

401 U.S. at 374.

131

Id. at 375.
Id. at 376.

132

tiffs were put in the same position as the
defendant who was "called upon to defend
his interests ....
For both groups this
process was not only the paramount dispute-settlement technique, but, in fact,
133
the only available one."
Justice Harlan further reasoned that due
process requires that one must be given, "a
meaningful opportunity to be heard," unless there is an overwhelming state interest
to be protected. 13 4 He could not find such
a state interest and therefore concluded that
the state's conduct constituted a denial to
the appellants of their right to be heard in
violation of due process.13 5 Justice Harlan
further believed that the Griffin philosophy
was applicable in this case. He reasoned
that since the fees in Boddie were imposed
as a prerequisite to access to court, and the
transcript in Griffin "could be waived as a
convenient but not necessary predicate to
court access," the principles expressed in
36
Griffin certainly should be applicable.
Justice Harlan also made reference to
service of process. He stated that "in this
case service at defendant's last known address by mail and posted notice [was]
equally effective as publication in a newspaper."113 7 "The implication [of this is] that
an indigent plaintiff may effect service by
mail if a state declines to arrange it for
him.' 133 Mailing was considered a "reliable
alternative . . . to service of process by a

Id.
Id. at 515.

129
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133
134
135
136
137
138

Id. at 376-77; See La France at 520.
401 U.S. at 377.
Id. at 380-81.
Id. at 382.

Id.
La France at 521.
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state-paid sheriff if the State is unwilling to
assume the cost of official service. '"u '
In Boddie, Justice Brennan and Justice
Douglas submitted concurring opinions.
Justice Douglas would have preferred a decision based more directly on the principles
in Griffin.140 He disagreed with the reliance
placed on the due process clause and the
subjective test involved. As he stated,
"[flishing may be [as] important [as divorce] to some communities.' 14 1 He contended that there have been formulated
equal protection guidelines, i.e., race, pov142
erty, alienage, religion, and class or caste,'
and implied that Boddie was consistent with
43
such guidelines.'

The lone dissenter in the case was Justice
Black. It was his position that since "marriage and divorce have always been considered to be under state control," the states
should have the power to charge this nominal cost in order to initiate such a proceeding. 147 He further believed that Griffin
48
should not be extended to the civil area.1
Implications of Boddie: In re Kras
One month after deciding Boddie, the
Supreme Court considered several cases
which dealt, in varying degrees, with the
principles espoused in Boddie. Of these
cases the Supreme Court denied certiorari
to five, 1 4 9 remanded two for reconsidera-

Justice Brennan believed that
[i]f fee requirements close the courts to an
indigent he can no more invoke the aid of
the courts for other forms of relief than he
can escape the legal incidents of marriage.
The right to be heard in some way at some
time extends to all proceedings entertained
by courts.

14 4

He did not think that the distinctions
drawn by the Court as to marital and other
actions would survive. 45 Justice Brennan
further contended that the Boddie case presented "a classic problem of equal protection of the laws" and should be decided
46
under the rationale of Griffin.'

139 401 U.S. at 382.
140

141
142

Id. at 383 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 385 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. (Douglas, J., concurring); La France at

522.
143 See La France at 522.
144
145
146

401 U.S. at 387-88 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 388.
Id.; see La France at 522.

147 401 U.S. at 389-90 (Black, J., dissenting).

Id. at 390 (Black, J., dissenting).
In support of his position Black relied on Cohen
v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
This case involved a stockholder's derivative action under which a statute, required stockholders
who held less than 5% or $50,000 market value
of the stock to post security so that, if unsuccessful, they could pay the reasonable expenses of the
trial. This provision of the law was challenged as
being violative of due process and equal protection. The Court held that it was not, stating that
"it is within the power of a state to close its courts
to this type of litigation if the condition of reasonable security is not met." Id. at 552. It was Black's
contention that the only difference between Cohen
and Boddie was that the latter involved a marriage and that this did not justify a different holding. 401 U.S. at 392-93 (Black, J., dissenting); La
France at 523.
149 In re Garland, 402 U.S. 966 (1971)
(concerning "the right of a bankrupt to file a petition for
discharge in bankruptcy without payment of the
.. .statutory fee." 402 U.S. 954); Bourbeau v.
Lancaster, 402 U.S. 964 (1971) (involving an
indigent who lost a civil case, "and who [could
not] afford to pay the fees for docketing an appeal." 402 U.S. at 955); Kaufman v. Carter, 402
U.S. 964 (1971) (dealing with "an indigent
mother [who] was denied court-appointed counsel
148
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tion in light of Boddie,150 and granted certiorari to one.' 5 '
Surprisingly, it was Justice Black, the
only dissenter in Boddie, who vehemently
objected to the Court's failure to take this
opportunity to extend it. He would have
granted certiorari to all these cases.152 He

believed that the Boddie case could only
rest on
one crucial foundation-that the civil
courts of the United States and each of the
States belong to the people of this country
and that no person can be denied access
to those courts, either for a trial or an appeal, because he cannot pay a fee, finance
a bond, risk a penalty, or afford to hire an
153
attorney.

to defend herself against a state civil suit to declare her an unfit mother and to take five of her
seven children away from her." 402 U.S. at 955);
Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954
(1971) (seeking to declare unconstitutional a law
which provided that if "a tenant ... [fought] his

eviction by resort to the judicial process [he
risked] the penalty of a judgment for double the
rent due during the litigation if he loses." 402
U.S. at 954-55); Beverly v. Scotland Urban Enterprises, Inc., 402 U.S. 936 (1971) (concerning an
indigent who could not "post the penalty [bond]
required to appeal from [an] adverse [judgement]
in [a] housing-eviction [case]." 402 U.S. at 955).
150 Sloatman v. Gibbons, 402 U.S. 939 (1971)
(in this case the lower court had decided that a
divorce filing fee could not be waived. All that it
permitted was to schedule the payments in installments. 402 U.S. 954); Frederick v. Schwartz, 402
U.S. 937 (1971) (involving an indigent who lost
a civil case, "and who [could not] afford to pay
the fees for docketing an appeal." 402 U.S. at
955).
151 Lindsey v. Normet, 402 U.S. 941 (1971)
(concerning an indigent who could not "post the
penalty [bond] required to appeal from [an] adverse [judgment] in [a] housing-eviction [case]"
402 U.S. at 955).
152 402 U.S. 954, 955 (Black, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 955-56 (Black, J., dissenting). Black
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In re Kras," 4 a bankruptcy proceeding,
was the first extension of the principles advanced in Boddie. The federal district court
in New York first had to consider whether
the indigent petitioner would be allowed to
proceed in forma pauperis according to section 1915(a) of title 28; and thereby avoid

attacked the two criteria, which the majority had
established in Boddie, that would have to be met
before a state must grant open access to its courts.
The first of these elements was that the court had
to be the only means for resolution of the dispute.
He believed this to be "no limitation at all." It is
evident, he continued, that
the State holds the ultimate remedy in almost
every property dispute. . . . Likewise, contracts
are valuable only because society will enforce
them. . . . Thus, the judicial process is the exclusive means through which almost any dispute can ultimately be resolved short of brute
force.
Id. at 956-57 (Black, J., dissenting).
The second element was that the dispute had to
involve a fundamental interest. Black contended
that if the Court is extending this fundamental interest to divorces, which "is simply not very
'fundamental' in the hierarchy of disputes," then,
"almost every other kind of legally enforceable
right is also fundamental to our society." Id. at
957-58 (Black, J., dissenting). Black further contended that Boddie should be extended to encompass the costs of appeal and also the right to
counsel. Id. at 958-59 (Black, J., dissenting).
Douglas also dissented on the denial of certiorari. He believed that this accentuated the difficulties with the position taken by the majority in
Boddie. Douglas contended that the fundamental
interest test which the majority had required, was
wrong, and that "[w]hen indigency is involved...
there is [no] hierarchy of interests." Id. at 961
(Douglas, J. dissenting).
154 No. 71B 972 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 13, 1971).
In Delaware ex rel. Caulk v. Nichols, 2 CCH
Pov. L. REP.
13,406 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1971), decided after Boddie, the court refused to waive an
appeal bond in the case of an indigent. "The appeal bond was held to be a jurisdictional requirement governing the right of appeal from a justice
court, and therefore, a judge could not waive
requiring it." Id.
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the filing fee. The court rejected this argument because Congress had eliminated
bankruptcy proceedings in forma pauperis.155 The best that could be hoped for
was that the payments be allowed in installments. 156
The court then considered whether this
filing fee violated the indigent's right to due
process or equal protection. Judge Travia,
who decided the case, was faced with two
recent and conflicting decisions in this area.
The first of these was In re Garland,15
wherein the bankruptcy filing fee was upheld as constitutional. The Garland court
did not believe that a bankruptcy discharge
is a fundamental right.' 58 It added that
the Congressional requirement of the payment of a $50. fee before receiving a discharge [does] not arbitrarily discriminate,
but [bears] a rational relation to the service
offered and to the bankrupt's need for that
service. 159
The court also held that to be classified an
indigent for bankruptcy purposes, a person
had to be " 'destitute,' with the exception
of assets specifically exempt."1 60

155

The second case was In re Smith.161
Therein, the court held that the bankruptcy
filing fee, when applied to indigents, did
violate equal protection. The court did not
find bankruptcy to be a fundamental interest in itself, but believed that when it was
combined with the question of access to
the courts, it took on "greater significance. '"162 This required the state to show

a compelling interest if the fee was to stand.
Since this was not accomplished the fee
63
was waived.'
Unlike Garland and Smith, however, the
Kras case was decided subsequent to the
Boddie decision. Judge Travia, in addition
to relying on Boddie, also depended on the
dissents of Justices Black and Douglas in
the denial of certiorari in the group of cases
which arose immediately after Boddie.
Judge Travia concluded that a discharge in
bankruptcy was a fundamental right. As
Black stated, "the need . . . to file for a

discharge in bankruptcy seems to me to be
more 'fundamental' than a person's right to
seek a divorce."'1 64 Agreeing, Justice Douglas, analogized dissolution of marriage to
obtaining a fresh start in life through bankruptcy proceedings. According to this reasoning, any violation of this right would

No. 71B 972 at 7.

156 Id. at 8.; see note 119 supra.
157 428 F.2d 1185 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied,

402 U.S. 966 (1971).
158 Id. at 1188.
159

Id.

160 Id. at 1187.

The court was skeptical of persons that sought
waiver of these fees. It did not believe that much
was at stake. According to the court, there were
only two types of assetless persons who would
want a discharge in bankruptcy. The first-deserving of no consideration-were those who had
assets and wanted to hide them. The second were
those who did not have assets, but wanted to protect future assets from creditors. The court stated

that this claim was not so compelling that the
state must grant a free discharge. Id. at 1188.
161 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971).
162 Id. at 1087.
163 Id. at 1090-91.
It was also observed, however, that the
petitioners obligation to pay the filing fee is not
permanently discharged but would arise again
if and when she is no longer indigent and can
pay the fee without undue hardship.
Id. at 1093.
164 402 U.S. at 958.
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have been a violation of equal protection
of law.' 65
Consequently, Judge Travia believed
that this filing fee did violate the petitioner's right to due process and equal
protection.' 6 He failed to find a countervailing state interest which was of such
magnitude as to justify the abridgment of
the pettitioner's right, 16 7 and, therefore,
deemed the filing fee waived.

Conclusion
The indigent may suffer substantial damage because of the many financial barriers
which impede his access to the courts.
These costs frequently bar [him] from enforcing his rights against substandard housing, retaliatory eviction, unconscionable
contracts, usurious loans, foreclosures and
repossessions, arbitrary administrative action denying or terminating statutory benefits, invasions of privacy, and the like. 168
Boddie accomplished two advances for
the indigent. The first is that the filing fees
in divorce cases must be waived if they are
an effective bar to entrance to the court; the
second, the provision for an indigent to

165 Id. at 961.
166 No. 71B 972 at 14.
167 The court concluded that the fee was not
necessary to the operation of the bankruptcy system and that, in fact, the entire basis of the bankruptcy fee system was unsound. Therefore the
government's interest in the fee was not compelling on this basis. Id. at 18-19.
Lastly the court found that there was no basis
for fear of frivolous claims. The bankruptcy system already had an adequate deterrent to this, i.e.,
the effect of a bankruptcy action bars by res
judicata any attempt to satisfy the scheduled
debts in any other action. Id. at 21.
168 Litigation costs at 517-18 (footnotes omitted).
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mail notice to the defendant of an impending divorce action if he cannot afford the
cost of publication and if the state has not
arranged for it or other suitable notice. 169
But, further progress must be made, with
Boddie as the foundation. Kras built on this
foundation, but only to a limited extent.
The Supreme Court had a golden opportunity to extend Boddie in the cases which
followed it. Yet, they chose not to do so.
Do they believe, as Black stated, that the
Boddie principles "can only be enforced
slowly step by step, so that the country will
170
have time to absorb its full import?"'
This would be a painful approach. The
indigent cannot afford to wait. Not only
may he be hurt individually, but he may
also be injured as a member of a class.
These litigation "costs may have a substantial impact on the conduct of test litigation
and may tend to foreclose broad law reform through law suits.''
There are, however, areas in which it
may be reasonable to expect an extension
of Boddie. It may find acceptance in cases
which concern domestic status, such as legal separations, annulments, child custody
and adoption. 7 2 It may also be expanded,
within a reasonable time, into those areas
where the court is the only place in which
relief can be sought.
If the Boddie and Kras decisions are to
have real significance, their philosophies
must be brought to bear upon the many
auxiliary and often extremely costly ex-

169
170
171
172

La France at 532.
402 U.S. 954, 956 (Black, J., dissenting).
Integration of Equal Protectionat 236.
La France at 534-35.
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penses. And, it is essential that the right to
counsel be extended to the indigent in a
73
civil action.'

In this respect it should be realized that if all
else has been financed, the amount of confusing
paper work and the awesome size and appearance
of the court may be a substantial deterrent to the
indigent. Concern towards giving the indigent a
meaningful right to be heard is, therefore, also of
great importance in this area.

In order to accomplish these ends, it will
be necessary for the Supreme Court to afford to all persons their constitutional
rights to due process and equal protec74
tion.'
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See generally Michelman, The Supreme Court
1968 Term, Foreward: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV.
174

L. REv. 7 (1969).

